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Preserving the Artistic Afterlife:  
The Challenges in Fulfilling Testator 
Wishes in Art-Rich, Cash-Poor Estates 
Hanna K. Feldman* 
Artists’ estates present unique legal issues distinct from the  
estates of art collectors-cum-investors, as these estates tend to be 
much more art-rich and cash-poor, leading to difficulties in funding 
legacies when there is no cash readily available and all of the value 
of the estate is tied up in the artworks themselves. Robert Indiana, 
an American sculptor who was frequently exploited throughout his 
life and now appears to be subject to posthumous exploitation, will 
be examined as a textbook example of such an artist’s estate. The 
issues surrounding Indiana’s estate exemplify the challenges in  
following a testator’s intent to leave a lasting artistic reputation 
when the artist has not also left behind the cash necessary to fund 
their dreams. This Note looks at the judicial doctrines of cy pres and 
equitable deviation and various legal scholars’ proposed solutions 
to modifying such impracticable dreams, particularly in the case of 
artists’ and art collectors’ estates. Specifically, the Note argues that 
Indiana’s collection should not be housed in his ramshackle man-
sion on a rural island in Maine, but rather should be bequeathed to 
the Farnsworth Museum in Rockland, Maine. Substantively, this 
Note concludes that public benefit should prevail over dead hand 
control in the case of artists’ estates. 
 
*  Editor-in-Chief, Fordham Intellectual Property, Media & Entertainment Law 
Journal, Volume XXX; J.D. Candidate, Fordham University School of Law, 2020; B.A., 
Political Science, Grinnell College, 2014. I would like to thank Professor Leila 
Amineddoleh for her helpful comments and guidance, as well as the staff and editors of the 
IPLJ, particularly Sean Corrado and Elliot Fink for their patience and superb edits. A 
special thanks to my parents Carla and Mark, my brother Brian, my parents’ pug Nacious, 
and my friends who provided their unflagging love and support throughout this process. 
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Robert Indiana, an American sculptor who died in May 2018, 
expressed his testamentary intent to create a museum out of his 
sprawling mansion in which all the artworks in his collection,  
including his own creations, would be housed.1 This noble and  
worthy wish, however, was doomed from the start. Indiana’s estate, 
like many other artists’,2 is art-rich and cash-poor, which means it is 
 
1 See infra text accompanying notes 10–29. 
2 Much like trends in other industries, there is an increasing income disparity between 
the wealthiest artists, such as Christopher Wool, Peter Doig, and Richard Prince, and the 
rest of artists, with 89% of the Contemporary Art market turnover being generated by its 
500 most successful artists, in a pool of over 20,000 artists. Deceased artist Jean-Michel 
Basquiat, Doig, and Rudolf Stingel together accounted for 22% of the market’s sales. The 
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filled with artworks considered illiquid assets as they are hard to sell, 
and low on cash to pay for after-death expenses such as taxes, pro-
bate, and administration.3 Most famous instances of disputes in the 
art world generally involve wealthy collectors, galleries and auction 
houses,4 rather than artists, as in the Barnes Foundation litigation.5 
Thus, the controversy around Indiana’s estate represents a departure 
from these circumstances, as his estate is art-rich but cash-poor, un-
like collectors’ estates like Barnes’s which are usually both art-rich 
and cash-rich. 
Therefore, Indiana represents the unusual case where an artist 
entrusts his works to a museum to be created in his honor, but his 
estate lacks the liquidity necessary to fulfill his wishes. Indiana’s 
wish to benefit the general public with the display of his artwork  
is an honorable one, and the difficulties surrounding his estate  
administration can serve as an exemplar for other art-rich, cash-poor  
estates on how to maximize public benefit without unduly burdening 
estate resources. 
Robert Indiana’s will and estate have many corresponding legal 
issues that may be implicated, including estate taxes,6 the validity of 
the will (since it is unclear if Indiana had the mental capacity to 
 
Contemporary Art Market Report 2018, ARTPRICE, https://www.artprice.com/artprice-
reports/the-contemporary-art-market-report-2018/artists-prices [https://perma.cc/3MZ7-
ARJL] (the report focused on auction sales in the Contemporary Art Market, hence 
targeting primarily living artists—with the exception of Basquiat’s untimely demise). 
3 See JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, ALBERT E. ELSEN & STEPHEN K. URICE, LAW, ETHICS 
AND THE VISUAL ARTS 925 (5th ed. 2007). 
4 See Harriet Fitch Little, How an Artist’s Legacy Became Big Business, FIN. TIMES 
(Aug. 26, 2016, 9:19 AM), https://www.ft.com/content/d77d5e74-69e5-11e6-ae5b-a7cc5d
d5a28c. 
5 See Daniel Grant, The Art of Art Lawsuits, HYPERALLERGIC (Feb. 4, 2014), 
https://hyperallergic.com/107150/the-art-of-lawsuits/ [http://perma.cc/ZQH3-MDSS]. 
6 See generally Erik J. Stapper, Trusts and Estates, in ART L. HANDBOOK 1033, 1035 
(Roy S. Kaufman ed., 2000) (explaining that there is an estate tax threshold over which an 
artist’s assets must be valued in order for tax to be assessed). Thanks to the 2017 Tax Act, 
the current threshold for estate taxation is $10 million, which Indiana’s estate easily 
surpasses with a valuation of $50 million. See Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 115-97, 
§ 11061, 131 Stat. 2054 (2017) (amending I.R.C. § 2010) (increasing the exemption cap 
for estate and gift tax exemptions for estates or gifts made after December 31, 2017 from 
$5 million to $10 million). 
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make the new will in 2016),7 the valuation of the estate,8 and the 
copyright infringement claims alleged by Morgan Art Foundation in 
the federal litigation filed a day before Indiana died.9 However, this 
Note will focus more narrowly on the feasibility of creating a  
 
7 See Stapper, supra note 6, at 1037–39. The will appears to have followed the local 
law’s (i.e., Maine’s) formalities, with the presence of adult disinterested witnesses (one 
was a CPA and the other a nurse practitioner, neither of whom resided in Vinalhaven, 
Maine) and executed by an attorney that was not James Brannan. See Last Will and 
Testament of Robert Indiana, at 3–4 (May 7, 2016) (on file with the Fordham Intellectual 
Property, Media & Entertainment Law Journal) [hereinafter Indiana Will]; see also infra 
Section I.A. Stapper notes that artists “working outside the mainstream of art or leading an 
alternative lifestyle may leave a will that could be considered an easy target for a contest 
on the ground of lack of mental capacity to make a will”; however, “eccentricity, delusions 
short of insanity, or bad living habits are not sufficient to invalidate a will. The test for the 
capacity to make a will is not general mental capacity; it is, rather, the ability to make a 
will at the time it is made.” Stapper, supra note 6, at 1038. Indiana fits this description well, 
having been isolated from the mainstream art world since the 1970s, leading an eccentric 
lifestyle and living in a rundown house on a rural island in Maine. See infra Section I.A. 
But, per Stapper, it does not appear that Indiana lacked the mental capacity to make the 
will since the standard is so high. All that is needed is a “lucid moment, in an otherwise 
disoriented life” to make a will valid. Id. at 1039. 
8 See Stapper, supra note 6, at 1063–71. The value of an artist’s estate is important in 
determining the amount of estate taxes, but complications arise with art, as personal 
property must be measured by the fair market value of the work at time of death, which 
can be hard to measure for previously unsold artworks by an artist and when the artist’s 
reputation could skyrocket after his death. Additionally, valuation of an artist’s estate must 
go beyond the price of unsold art and measure the stream of income that was earned in the 
artist’s business. Several cases have been litigated disputing the worth of artists’ estates. 
See, e.g., David Smith Estate v. Comm’r, 57 T.C. 650 (1972), acq. 1974–2 C.B. 4, aff’d, 
510 F.2d 479 (2d Cir. 1975); Georgia O’Keeffe Estate v. Comm’r, 63 T.C.M. (CCH) 2699 
(1992); Louisa J. Calder v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 713 (1985); In re Estate of Warhol, 165 
Misc. 2d. 72, 629 N.Y.S.2d 621 (1st Dep’t 1995), aff’d as modified, 224 A.D.2d 235, 637 
N.Y.S.2d 708 (1st Dep’t 1996). The latter case involved a dispute over the amounts to be 
paid as executor’s commission and in attorney fees, as most states set these fees as a 
percentage of the estate. The lawyer who was executor of Andy Warhol’s estate was 
eventually paid $3.5 million. Indiana may not have to worry about paying estate taxes since 
he bequeathed all of his property to a nonprofit organization which is tax-exempt. See 
I.R.C. § 642(c). 
9 Complaint at 1, Morgan Art Found. Ltd. v. McKenzie, No. 1:18–cv–04438–AT–BCM 
(S.D.N.Y. filed May 18, 2018); see also MERRYMAN ET AL., supra note 3, at 959–60 
(referencing a similar authenticity dispute that arose after sculptor Jacques Lipchitz died 
and his wife Yulla, also a sculptor, completed his unfinished, commissioned project, albeit 
changing its dimensions in the process from a planned 30-foot bronze to a 20-foot-tall one; 
Yulla claimed that she had been directed to do so by her husband’s mandate and was 
vouched by sculptor Henry Moore who “proclaim[ed] her as the one to do the job”). 
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museum out of Indiana’s house, Star of Hope, and the legal mecha-
nisms for modifying Indiana’s will if Indiana’s wish cannot be  
executed, as this Note argues is the case. In doing so, this Note will 
examine the many interests involved in the resolution of the disputed 
will and propose a solution that will heighten public benefit and pub-
lic access to the artist’s works while also maintaining respect for the 
artist’s wishes, a delicate balance over which many legal scholars 
have debated. This Note will rely on the legal doctrines of cy pres 
and equitable deviation, which are implicated when changed cir-
cumstances render execution of the testator’s original estate plan  
impossible and modification becomes necessary, using the Indiana 
case as a touchstone. 
Part I outlines a brief survey of past legal controversies sur-
rounding artists’ estates, with a close look at Robert Indiana’s  
estate and ongoing litigation. Part II discusses the legal doctrines 
governing the administration of estates and nonprofit corporations, 
including fiduciary duties, and explains options for modifying a will 
that still strive to effectuate donor intent. Previous examples of 
courts applying these legal principles to art estates and foundations 
will be examined and compared to the Indiana case. Part II also  
discusses legal scholarship on whether the testator’s intent should 
be priorit ized over the public benefit of the gift. This Note will then 
argue why public benefit should prevail over dead hand control in 
the case of art estates. Finally, Part III proposes solutions for artists’ 
estates to consider both pre- and postmortem when artists have an 
honorable charitable purpose of displaying their artwork for the pub-
lic benefit, but their plans for doing so are impracticable to execute. 
I. BACKGROUND OF ARTISTS’ ESTATES: NO AMOUNT OF 
PLANNING CAN PREPARE FOR CHANGED CIRCUMSTANCES 
A. Robert Indiana 
Robert Indiana—born Robert Clark in 1928 in New Castle,  
Indiana—was an artist and sculptor known for his assemblage, hard-
edge painting, and Pop art, who gained notoriety in the New York 
art scene in the 1960s and 1970s and ran in the same artists’  
community as Ellsworth Kelly, Agnes Martin, James Rosenquist, 
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and Jack Youngerman.10 Indiana reached the pinnacle of his fame 
with the success of his LOVE image in the mid-1960s, which the 
Museum of Modern Art used as the image on its Christmas card in 
1965.11 However, with his success came widespread unauthorized 
reproduction of his work and incorrect assumptions that he was a 
“sell-out.”12 By 1978,13 after he had become embittered by the New 
York art world, with its rampant unauthorized copying and lack of 
appreciation for his other art besides LOVE, Indiana retreated to the 
remote island of Vinalhaven, an hour’s ferry ride off the coast of 
mainland Maine.14 However, Indiana’s retreat wasn’t exactly incon-
spicuous, as he took up residence in the island’s “most remarkable 
building” known as the Star of Hope, a sprawling Victorian mansion 
that formerly served as an Odd Fellows Lodge.15 Indiana continued 
to create art while living on this remote island, and eventually passed 
away in the Star of Hope on May 19, 2018.16 
A day before Indiana died,17 Morgan Art Foundation (MAF), 
“Indiana’s representative since the 1990s and the owner of the  
artist’s famous Love trademark,” sued the artist’s “long-time assis-
tant, Jamie Thomas, and an art publisher, Michael McKenzie” in the 
Southern District of New York federal court.18 MAF alleged that 
 
10 See Biography, ROBERTINDIANA.COM, http://robertindiana.com/biography/ 
[https://perma.cc/7AYQ-KRJM]. 
11 See id. 
12 Id. 
13 See id. 
14 Murray Carpenter & Graham Bowley, The Artist Vanished, N.Y. TIMES (May 23, 
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/21/arts/design/robert-indiana-vanished-artist.
html [https://perma.cc/M8M9-HRKD] [hereinafter Carpenter & Bowley, Artist Vanished]. 
(Vinalhaven’s 1,200 year-round residents rely primarily on granite quarries and lobster 
fishing for income.).  
15 Id.; see also Murray Carpenter, Robert Indiana’s Estate: Generosity, Acrimony, and 
Questions, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 12, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/12/arts/design/
robert-indianas-estate-generosity-acrimony-and-questions.html [https://perma.cc/2VUT-
GL34]. The Odd Fellows is a fraternal organization founded in England in the eighteenth 
century. See Odd Fellow, DICTIONARY.COM, https://www.dictionary.com/browse/odd-
fellow?s=ts [https://perma.cc/2SLQ-EVL9]. 
16 Jori Finkel, Robert Indiana, Whose ‘Love’ Is an Art Icon of the 20th Century, Dies at 
89, N.Y. TIMES (May 21, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/21/obituaries/robert-
indiana-love-pop-art-dies.html [https://perma.cc/D82X-6AFT]. 
17 See Carpenter & Bowley, Artist Vanished, supra note 14. 
18 Anny Shaw & Jillian Steinhauer, Will Robert Indiana’s Legacy Get Stuck in a Legal 
Battle?, ART NEWSPAPER (July 19, 2018, 9:00 AM), https://www.theartnewspaper.com/
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Thomas and McKenzie exploited Indiana towards the end of his life 
by “producing dubious works in his name and isolating him from 
friends”;19 these allegations appear to be supported by an investiga-
tive piece timely published by the New York Times hours before 
Indiana’s death had been announced.20 The lawsuit also challenges 
the validity of Indiana’s will, signed and dated May 7, 2016, “which 
gives Thomas power of attorney and names him as the executive 
director of a museum the artist intended to be established at his home 
and studio” on Vinalhaven.21 
Indiana’s will expressly states his testamentary intent regarding 
nearly all of his property: “[A]ll works of art created by me . . .  
located at Star of Hope, Vinalhaven, Maine, or elsewhere, together 
with my residence known as Star of Hope at 46 Main Street, 
Vinalhaven, Maine” shall be “give[n], devise[d] and bequeath[ed] 
to a 501(C)(3) not for profit organization under the Internal Revenue 
Code, to be formed by my Personal Representative,” James Bran-
nan.22 Further, Indiana stated that it is his “intent that my Star of 
Hope Real Estate be restored to museum quality for use as an art 
environment open to the public for visits, classes and lectures and 
for the continued preservation, promotion, exhibition and use of  
my Collection and Real Estate.”23 The Will then specifies that Jamie 
L. Thomas of Vinalhaven, Maine, “shall serve as the Executive  
Director of [the Star of Hope Foundation], for so long as he wishes, 
as I know he is willing to carry out my intent and to provide for the 
continued preservation, promotion and exhibition of my Collection 
and use of Real Estate.”24 
The Will also directs that all royalty payments received under 
the “Morgan Rights Agreement dated April 9, 1999 and the ‘Morgan 
Sculpture Agreement’ dated December 22, 1999 and any other . . .  
rights to income and royalties” will go to the non-profit organization 
 
news/will-robert-indiana-s-legacy-get-stuck-in-a-legal-battle [https://perma.cc/3L34-
4NUE]; see also Complaint at 1, Morgan Art Found. Ltd. v. McKenzie, No. 1:18-cv-
04438-AT-BCM (S.D.N.Y. filed May 18, 2018). 
19 Shaw & Steinhauer, supra note 18. 
20 See Carpenter & Bowley, Artist Vanished, supra note 14. 
21 Shaw & Steinhauer, supra note 18; see also Indiana Will, supra note 7, at 2. 
22 Indiana Will, supra note 7, at 1–2. 
23 Id. at 2. 
24 Id. 
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to help transform Indiana’s house into a museum.25 The Will further 
appoints James W. Brannan as executor of Indiana’s estate, unless 
he is unable to do so, in which case Jamie L. Thomas will fill the 
role instead.26 Brannan appears to have worked closely with Indiana 
at least since 2016, as he created the Star of Hope Foundation shortly 
after the will was executed, on June 22, 2016.27 The Star of Hope 
Foundation is a nonprofit corporation registered in Maine28 and is 
registered with the Internal Revenue Service as a private operating 
foundation rather than a public charity, which still renders it tax-
exempt and eligible for donations that are deductible as charitable 
contributions under Internal Revenue Code Section § 170.29 
As is the case with many estates of large value, there are  
numerous players with vested interests in how the $50 million  
worth of assets in Indiana’s estate will be utilized.30 Morgan Art 
Foundation Ltd. (“MAF”) is a Bahamas limited liability company31 
formed in 1993 by Mossack Fonseca,32 the now-dissolved Panama-
nian law firm at the center of the Panama Papers scandal.33 In the 
 
25 Id. 
26 Id. at 2–3. 




29 See Details About Star of Hope, Inc., IRS, https://apps.irs.gov/app/eos/ (select 
“Organization Name” from the “Search By” drop-down menu, “ME” from the “State” 
drop-down menu, and search “Star of Hope” for the search term). Although the entity is 
technically registered as Star of Hope, Inc., I refer to it as the Star of Hope Foundation to 
clarify its status as a nonprofit organization. 
30 See Carpenter, supra note 15 (“Over the summer, an appraiser hired by Mr. Brannan 
estimated the value of art contained in Mr. Indiana’s home at approximately $50 million.”). 
31 Complaint at 9, Morgan Art Found. Ltd. v. McKenzie, No. 1:18–cv–04438–AT–BCM 
(S.D.N.Y. filed May 18, 2018). 
32 Declaration of Hardin P. Rowley in Support of Defendant American Image Art’s 
Motion to Stay at Exhibit 1 (Report Concerning Morgan Art Foundation Limited from the 
Offshore Leaks Database of the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists, 
available at https://offshoreleaks.icij.org/nodes/10214036 [https://perma.cc/8GQM-
VG8N]), No. 1:18-cv-04438-AT-BCM (No. 102) (Nov. 6, 2018). 
33 Nicola Slawson, Mossack Fonseca Law Firm to Shut Down After Panama Papers Tax 
Scandal, GUARDIAN, (Mar. 14, 2018, 5:35 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/
mar/14/mossack-fonseca-shut-down-panama-papers [https://perma.cc/Z5VQ-M8KR]. 
The Panama Papers was a large-scale scandal in 2016 in which 11.5 million files were 
leaked from the Mossack Fonseca law firm in Panama, the fourth biggest offshore law firm 
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1990s, MAF and its advisor, Simon Salama-Caro, sought out  
Indiana; during a meeting with MAF and Indiana, an agreement was 
reached wherein the artist would receive 50% net-income royalties 
from reproductions, promotions, and sales, in exchange for MAF 
owning all the intellectual property rights to many of Indiana’s most 
iconic creations, including “LOVE.”34 MAF and Salama-Caro have 
been credited with “effectuating Indiana’s ‘comeback,’ which  
culminated in a 2013 exhibition at the Whitney Museum, ‘Robert 
Indiana: Beyond Love,’ the first major retrospective of the artist’s 
works.”35 Salama-Caro received commissions on sales, and he  
and his family have spearheaded the effort to compile a catalogue  
raisonné of Indiana’s works.36 
The defendants in MAF’s suit are Michael McKenzie, his art 
publishing business, American Image Art (AIA), Jamie Thomas, 
and Indiana’s Estate.37 AIA, unlike MAF, appears to have a number 
of other artists besides Indiana as clients, and published two books 
with Indiana imagery in the 1990s.38 McKenzie claims that his  
relationship with Indiana goes back to the 1970s, and he, like  
 
in the world. The files showed the numerous ways in which the world’s richest were 
exploiting offshore tax havens. See Luke Harding, What Are the Panama Papers? A Guide 
to History’s Biggest Data Leak, GUARDIAN (Apr. 5, 2016, 5:42 AM), https://www.the
guardian.com/news/2016/apr/03/what-you-need-to-know-about-the-panama-papers 
[https://perma.cc/8HW6-ZDQW]. 
34 See Matthew A. Marcucci, In Pair of Lawsuits, Robert Indiana’s Former Associates 
Are Vying for Control of the Late Artist’s Legacy, GROSSMAN LLP: ART L. BLOG (Aug. 30, 
2018), https://www.grossmanllp.com/in-pair-of-lawsuits-robert-indianarsquos-former-a 
[https://perma.cc/3DSC-PDNL]; see also Carpenter & Bowley, Artist Vanished, supra note 
14. 
35 Marcucci, supra note 34. 
36 Carpenter & Bowley, Artist Vanished, supra note 14; see also Catalogues Raisonnés 
Users’ Guide, INT’L FOUND. ART RES., https://www.ifar.org/users_guide.php 
[https://perma.cc/J7L6-ZTN8]. A catalogue raisonné is a definitive guide containing all of 
the works known to be made by the artist, and the author of the catalogue frequently must 
make assessments as to a piece’s authenticity, thus giving these catalogues enormous 
power and clout in the art world. See, e.g., Eileen Kinsella, The Warhol Market Gets Even 
Wilder as Richard Polsky Releases an Unauthorized Addendum to the Catalogue Raisonné, 
ARTNET (July 19, 2017), https://news.artnet.com/art-world/exclusive-richard-polsky-
announces-warhol-catalogue-raisonne-addition-1026629 [https://perma.cc/96YU-B9L8]. 
37 Complaint at 8, Morgan Art Found. Ltd. v. McKenzie, No. 1:18–cv–04438–AT–BCM 
(S.D.N.Y. filed May 18, 2018). 
38 See Carpenter & Bowley, Artist Vanished, supra note 14. 
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MAF and Salama-Caro, takes credit for rebuilding Indiana’s repu-
tation, including through his promotion of “Indiana’s ‘HOPE’  
image, which the artist created to support the Obama campaign,” 
and organizing a 2016 show at the Bates College museum.39 Unsur-
prisingly, asserting counterclaims against MAF that the works 
McKenzie and AIA produced were “not forgeries at all but the direct 
result of a successful partnership initiated by Indiana himself,” 
McKenzie and AIA present a vastly different picture of the events 
underlying the dispute.40 “Moreover, AIA purports to have . . . paid 
the artist nearly $10 million in royalties under an agreement between 
AIA and Indiana” and alleges that MAF is using the lawsuit as a 
“tactic to distract from MAF’s failure to pay the artist what it owed 
him.”41 The aforementioned agreement between AIA and Indiana 
was undertaken in 2008 and contained an arbitration provision 
which Judge Analisa Torres declared was binding, thus forcing a 
stay on the S.D.N.Y. action while the parties go to arbitration.42 
Jamie Thomas, over thirty years younger than Indiana, formerly 
operated a seafood business on Vinalhaven before becoming  
 
39 Id. (McKenzie co-organized the Bates College museum show alongside Landau 
Traveling Exhibitions. Professor Wilmerding, a close friend of Indiana’s, traveled to the 
Bates exhibition and felt that the newer pieces were in Indiana’s “vocabulary” but not 
necessarily “his voice.”) Carpenter and Bowley suggest that MAF and Salama-Caro were 
more well-known as the representatives of Indiana than McKenzie, especially within New 
York art circles. Id. 
40 Marcucci, supra note 34; see also Verified Amended Answer, Counter-Claims & 
Cross-Claims of Michael McKenzie & American Image Art at 36, ¶ 282, Morgan Art 
Foundation Ltd. v. McKenzie, No. 1:18–cv–04438–AT–BCM (S.D.N.Y. filed Aug. 3, 
2018). 
41 Marcucci, supra note 34. However, McKenzie and AIA likely have some culpability, 
as McKenzie testified in a probate court hearing in Maine in early September that he 
“returned more than 60 works to the estate since Mr. Indiana’s death.” Carpenter, supra 
note 15. However, McKenzie seems prone to hyperbole, as he stated that he “had five 
people on this [recovering the art works], 40 hours a week, for a month.” Id. 
42 See Order to Arbitrate, Morgan Art Foundation Ltd. v. McKenzie, No. 1:18–cv–
04438–AT–BCM (S.D.N.Y. filed Oct. 9, 2018); see also Tiffany Hu, Artist Robert 
Indiana’s Estate Can Arbitrate Dealer’s Claims, LAW360 (Oct. 10, 2018, 8:24 PM), 
https://www.law360.com/articles/1090769/artist-robert-indiana-s-estate-can-arbitrate-
dealer-s-claims [https://perma.cc/ZAU8-4XQJ]. This Note will not be discussing the 
ongoing litigation concerning MAF and AIA, except to note that these entities will be 
interested in how the Star of Hope Foundation is run, as both parties stand to gain 
reputation-wise and monetarily depending on their future role in the museum and ongoing 
relationship with the Star of Hope Foundation. 
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Indiana’s studio assistant in the 1990s and eventually graduating to  
Indiana’s full-time caretaker in 2013. In 2016, Thomas was granted 
power of attorney for Indiana, the same year Indiana’s will was  
revised to remove Ronald D. Spencer as executive director of the 
future museum and naming Thomas in his stead.43 During a probate 
court hearing in Maine in early September 2018, Thomas testified 
that he was paid approximately $250,000 per year to tend to Indiana, 
an astounding increase from the initial $1,000 per week that he was 
earning in 2013 when he started taking care of the aging artist.44  
Thomas further testified that he was gifted “at least 118 pieces 
[from Indiana] since 2010” and had withdrawn $615,000 from  
Indiana’s accounts in the last two years of Indiana’s life, purportedly 
by the artist’s request.45 Such suspicious financial activity is  
alarming when combined with Thomas’s simultaneous control of 
access to Indiana. There were numerous people who reported that 
Thomas isolated Indiana from the outside world, with Thomas  
 
43 See Carpenter & Bowley, Artist Vanished, supra note 14 (noting that in a will 
executed prior to 2016, Indiana had stipulated that “his works and house . . . be transferred 
to a foundation to be overseen by a New York lawyer, Ronald D. Spencer,” but Spencer 
was “let go in 2016” and that same year Indiana’s power of attorney was given to Thomas, 
granting him the authority to make decisions on Indiana’s behalf). Ronald D. Spencer, 
counsel at Carter, Ledyard & Milburn LLP, is a prominent lawyer in the art world, 
specializing in art authentication and helping art investors with attribution and provenance 
of works of art. See Ronald D. Spencer, CARTER, LEDYARD & MILBURN LLP, 
https://www.clm.com/attorney/spencer_ronald [https://perma.cc/M945-7XZC]. Spencer is 
currently embroiled in litigation himself, after the widower of the deceased former 
chairman and chief executive of the Pollock-Krasner Foundation, Charles C. Bergman, 
challenged the appointment of Spencer as successor to run the Pollack-Krasner Foundation. 
The widower accused Spencer of strong-arming his way into the position after representing 
the Foundation for decades. The widower also challenges Spencer’s appointment as 
executor of Bergman’s will. See Jillian Steinhauer, Widower Takes Aim at Chairman of 
Pollock-Krasner Foundation, ART NEWSPAPER (Dec. 8, 2016, 12:58 AM), https://www.the
artnewspaper.com/news/lawsuit-faults-head-of-pollock-krasner-foundation 
[https://perma.cc/DV3S-7Z5E]. 
44 See Carpenter, supra note 15. The probate hearing in Knox County Probate Court was 
requested by James Brannan, executor of the estate, to “clear up multiple questions that 
have swirled about Mr. Indiana’s finances in recent months,” including clarifying “whether 
any money was owed to the estate . . . , get[ting] a solid inventory of the whereabouts of 
all the art works Mr. Indiana left behind and address[ing] accusations, contained in a 
separate lawsuit, that Mr. Thomas and a New York art publisher [McKenzie] had made 
unauthorized works under Mr. Indiana’s name in recent years.” Id. 
45 Id. 
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rebuffing any and all attempts by Indiana’s friends and colleagues 
to reach the artist by phone or email.46 Thomas’s appointment as 
executive director of the Star of Hope museum has also been a cause 
of concern, as Thomas has no background in the art world and  
several parties have questioned his qualifications “to establish or run 
a museum of the kind Indiana stipulated in his will.”47 
Meanwhile, James Brannan, a lawyer based in Rockland, Maine, 
is a somewhat questionable appointee for the executor of Indiana’s 
estate.48 Brannan appears to have begun representing Indiana at least 
as early as 2016, as he was the registered agent responsible for  
creating the Star of Hope Foundation as a non-profit corporation in 
Maine on June 22, 2016.49 Brannan has quite a host of issues to  
contend with as executor of the estate, including Thomas’s suspi-
cious conduct, including possible undue influence over Indiana50 
and breach of fiduciary duty while holding Indiana’s power of attor-
ney,51 recovery of possible money owed to the estate by MAF and 
 
46 See Carpenter & Bowley, Artist Vanished, supra note 14. 
47 See Robert Indiana and the Importance of a Will, FREEMAN’S (Sept. 19, 2018), 
https://www.freemansauction.com/news/robert-indiana-and-importance-will 
[https://perma.cc/5J3F-6QPE]; see also Shaw & Steinhauer, supra note 18. Both these 
publications reference remarks by Luke Nikas, MAF’s lawyer and esteemed art law partner 
at Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP, stating that Thomas is not qualified to run a 
museum of this kind and instead, “a ‘diverse board’ of specialists should manage [the 
museum] and protect Indiana’s legacy and market.” Nikas recommended “collector and 
curator John Wilmerding, the New York gallerist Paul Kasmin and representatives at the 
Whitney Museum of American Art in New York, which staged Indiana’s retrospective in 
2013, as well as the Farnsworth Art Museum in Rockland, Maine.” Shaw & Steinhauer, 
supra note 18. Thomas is not entirely without a background in art, as he did help Indiana 
as a studio assistant for several years, but his experience seems to have been limited to 
stretching canvases. See Marcucci, supra note 34. 
48 Carpenter & Bowley, Artist Vanished, supra note 14. 
49 See supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
50 See Stapper, supra note 6, at 1039. Undue influence could be argued in Indiana’s case 
because of the appointment of power of attorney to Jaime Thomas in 2016 and his 
subsequent enlarged role in Indiana’s 2016 will—i.e., as the Executive Director of the 
future museum to house Indiana’s works. See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
Stapper cites Georgia O’Keeffe’s will as an example of a will attacked for undue influence 
“because it favored a much younger longtime assistant over the family.” See Stapper, supra 
note 6, at 1039. Indiana similarly favored Thomas over any remaining family he has, 
although a party trying to make this argument will likely be unsuccessful, just as 
O’Keeffe’s family was. Id. 
51 See, e.g., Carpenter, supra note 15 (citing an incident during a visit by Brannan to 
Vinalhaven shortly after Indiana’s death in which Thomas’s wife, Yvonne, handed 
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AIA,52 accusations that Thomas and AIA “made unauthorized 
works under Mr. Indiana’s name in recent years,”53 restoration of 
the Star of Hope into a museum-quality building, and management 
of the museum as one of its two board members.54 
Brannan has already faced a dearth of cash in light of all these 
issues and in November 2018, just six months after Indiana’s death, 
sold off two major artworks from Indiana’s collection.55 Brannan 
stated that the money was needed to pay mounting legal fees in  
connection with contesting the S.D.N.Y. lawsuit, repairs needed  
to fix the Star of Hope’s leaking roof, and costs for moving Indiana’s 
art out of the house and into safe storage.56 Brannan is legally  
entitled to sell assets of Indiana’s estate because Maine probate  
law grants executors this power without any prior judicial  
review needed.57 
 
Brannan “a gym bag filled with $189,000 in cash,” telling him it “belonged to the estate”); 
see also Andrew H. Hook, Durable Powers of Attorney, in 859 TAX MGMT.: EST., GIFTS, 
& TR. A-3–A-5 (2000) (outlining the fiduciary duties an agent with durable powers of 
attorney owes to the principal). In August 2019, Brannan filed a lawsuit against Thomas in 
Knox County Superior Court in Maine, alleging that Thomas breached his fiduciary duties 
by pocketing $1.1 million from the artist while subsequently allowing Indiana to live in 
“squalor and filth,” despite Indiana having $13 million in the bank. See Answer for 
Defendant at 12, Brannan v. Thomas, No. CV–19–19 (Me. Super. Ct. filed Aug. 13, 2019). 
See also Naomi Rea, Robert Indiana’s Estate Accuses His Caretaker of Allowing the 89-
Year-Old Artist to Live in ‘Squalor’ Before He Died, ARTNET (Aug. 16, 2019), https://news.
artnet.com/art-world/robert-indiana-lawsuit-claims-squalor-1627561 
[https://perma.cc/FK7G-BMF3]. It is unclear why Brannan needed to sell artworks in 
Indiana’s collection if the requisite funds were already available in Indiana’s bank account 
upon his death. See infra text accompanying notes 55–56. 
52 Shaw & Steinhauer, supra note 18. 
53 Carpenter, supra note 15; see also Complaint at 6, Morgan Art Found. Ltd. v. 
McKenzie, No. 1:18–cv–04438–AT–BCM (S.D.N.Y. filed May 18, 2018). 
54 See Carpenter, supra note 15. Thomas is the other board member of the Star of Hope 
Foundation. For further discussion on potential conflicts of interest in holding dual 
positions of executor and board member of the foundation, see infra Section I.D. 
(examining the Rothko case). 
55 See Graham Bowley & Murray Carpenter, Robert Indiana Estate to Sell Art Valued 
at Up to $4 Million, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 8, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/06/
arts/design/robert-indiana-estate-to-sell-art-valued-at-up-to-4-million.html 
[https://perma.cc/A3P3-XRLR] [hereinafter Bowley & Carpenter, Estate to Sell Art]. 
56 See id. 
57 See id.; see also ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18–A, § 3–715 (1979) (listing building 
repairs and sale of assets as transactions authorized for an executor to make without judicial 
approval beforehand). Maine is also one of three states in the United States that allows 
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Brannan’s decision to sell the artworks—one by Ellsworth Kelly 
entitled “Orange Blue” and gifted specifically to Indiana with a spe-
cial inscription on the back, the other by Ed Ruscha titled “Ruby”—
was not without controversy, as friends close to the artist including 
Kathleen Rogers, his former publicist, and John Wilmerding,  
emeritus professor of American art at Princeton University, objected 
to the sale. For instance, Wilmerding suggested that “the Indiana 
legacy was being diminished by off-loading works that were crucial 
to the artist’s identity.”58 Wilmerding further stated that no sale 
should occur until the members of the Star of Hope Foundation had 
assessed the “artistic importance of any works to be sold.”59  
Brannan reported that he had consulted a curator to determine which 
pieces to sell, but declined to provide the curator’s name.60 While 
the sale of these two works is lamentable and seems to demonstrate 
Brannan’s willingness to deaccession Indiana’s own works as a 
board member of the museum, he should be able to abstain from 
further sales for the foreseeable future, as the two pieces raked in 
over $6 million at the November 16, 2018 auction at Christie’s.61 
 
estate taxes to be paid directly with works of art. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, §§ 92–
93 (1979); see also LEONARD D. DUBOFF, CHRISTY A. KING & MICHAEL D. MURRAY, ART 
LAW IN A NUTSHELL 160 (4th ed. 2006) (noting that Connecticut and New Mexico, as well 
as France and the United Kingdom also allow this practice of paying estate taxes directly 
with works of art). 
58 Bowley & Carpenter, Estate to Sell Art, supra note 55. The article cited Indiana’s 
former romantic relationship with Ellsworth Kelly as the reason “Orange Blue” is so crucial 
to Indiana’s collection, while the argument for keeping Ruscha’s “Ruby” is less persuasive, 
as both artists working in the “verbal tradition” seems a bit tenuous of a connection. Id. 
However, the article also mentions that Indiana might have bought the work because a 
woman named Ruby “was accused of the murder of his stepgrandmother [sic]—an 
emotional ordeal that may have been a catalyst for his parents’ divorce.” Id. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. 
61 See Bob Keyes, Indiana-Owned Art Sells for Millions at Auction, PORTLAND PRESS 
HERALD, Nov. 17, 2018, at B2, available at https://www.pressherald.com/2018/11/16/two-
paintings-owned-by-robert-indiana-sell-for-5-million-at-auction/ [https://perma.cc/NBV2
-HEBT]. Although the paintings sold for $5 million, it is unclear how much of the money 
the estate will ultimately net after commission. For exact sales prices, visit the Christie’s 
Post-War and Contemporary Art Auction page, accessible here: https://www.christies.
com/SaleLanding/index.aspx?intsaleid=27589&lid=1&saletitle= [https://perma.cc/A29N-
FZ9B]. 
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As Indiana never married and had few close relatives,62 it  
appears unlikely that any of his assets would be reverted from the 
Star of Hope Foundation to anyone in his family in the event the 
foundation’s purpose to establish a museum should fail ab initio.63 
The Maine Attorney General’s Office has been monitoring the 
case64 because Indiana “left the assets of his estate to a charitable 
organization, a nonprofit corporation known as the Star of Hope 
Foundation.”65 Because there are no shareholders besides the  
general public benefitting from a nonprofit corporation’s assets, the 
Attorney General retains a residual supervisory duty to ensure the 
assets are being properly managed.66 
The Farnsworth Museum in Rockland, Maine has also been  
following the case, even sending its chief curator, Michael  
Komanecky, to the probate hearing proceedings in September 2018 
in Knox County to learn more about the artist’s estate.67 The Farns-
worth has long been a supporter of Indiana, organizing a “major  
survey [of the artist’s work] in 2009—the same year [Indiana’s]  
illuminated sculpture EAT was first installed on the museum’s roof. 
In 2012, Indiana told The Art Newspaper that the Farnsworth would 
probably inherit his collection.”68 Christopher Brownawell, the  
director of the Farnsworth, says the museum is “uniquely equipped 
to preserve and promote [Indiana’s] legacy and his important con-
tributions to American art . . . . If the time arises, we will certainly 
be ready, willing and able to assist.”69 Komanecky indicated that 
such assistance might take the form of a Robert Indiana Center to  
be developed at the Farnsworth, in conjunction with helping the  
museum to be established on Vinalhaven, stating, “[t]he Farnsworth 
 
62 Carpenter & Bowley, Artist Vanished, supra note 14. 
63 See generally Evelyn Brody, From the Dead Hand to the Living Dead: The 
Conundrum of Charitable-Donor Standing, 41 GA. L. REV. 1183 (2007) (discussing 
reversionary interests in charitable gifts in the context of issues with donor standing). 
64 Shaw & Steinhauer, supra note 18. 
65 Carpenter, supra note 15. See infra notes 125–127 and accompanying text for further 
discussion of the Attorney General’s role in monitoring nonprofit charitable organizations. 
66 See Brody, supra note 63, at 1187–88. 
67 Carpenter, supra note 15. 
68 Shaw & Steinhauer, supra note 18. 
69 Id. 
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remains committed to supporting Robert Indiana’s wishes for the 
Star of Hope and the collection he has there.”70 
B. Barnes Foundation 
The most analogous case to Indiana’s is that of the Barnes Foun-
dation.71 Dr. Albert Barnes was a chemist who made his fortune in 
pharmaceuticals during the turn of the twentieth century.72  
Dr. Barnes established the Barnes Foundation in 1922 “as an educa-
tional institution that would train students in Dr. Barnes’s theories 
of art aesthetics.”73 Dr. Barnes erected a building in Merion,  
Pennsylvania, a then-rural suburb outside Philadelphia, to house the 
collection, and donated his priceless collection to the Foundati on.74 
Dr. Barnes imposed many stringent restrictions in the trust inden-
ture, charter and bylaws creating the Foundation, including specifi-
cations that the artworks remain exactly as he hung it in the building 
that he had custom-designed to house his collection, bans on lend-
ing, selling, or otherwise moving the art outside the Barnes facility, 
and limited hours for allowing the public to view the collection.75 
The Foundation operated relatively undisturbed by litigation  
until the 1990s, when little professional or private support remained 
and the Foundation became strapped for cash, as investment  
restrictions Barnes had put in place “hinder[ed] the facility’s mainte-
nance and quality.”76 In 1993, the trustees proposed selling some of 
 
70 Carpenter, supra note 15. 
71 See Robert Indiana and the Importance of a Will, supra note 47. 
72 Chris Abbinante, Comment, Protecting “Donor Intent” in Charitable Foundations: 
Wayward Trusteeship and the Barnes Foundation, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 665, 666 (1997). 
73 Susan N. Gary, The Problems with Donor Intent: Interpretation, Enforcement, and 
Doing the Right Thing, 85 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 977, 985 (2010) [hereinafter Gary, Problems 
with Donor Intent]. 
74 See Abbinante, supra note 72, at 666–67. 
75 See Gary, Problems with Donor Intent, supra note 73, at 985. 
76 Abbinante, supra note 72, 672 n.43, 673 n.55 (1997) (citing Barnes Indenture and 
Agreement, art. IX, ¶ 27 (Dec. 6, 1922), which mandated that the Foundation’s funds be 
invested only in low-yielding government securities). There were two lawsuits in the 1950s 
and 1960s, with the former requiring that the Foundation open its doors to the public or 
lose its tax-exempt status and the latter allowing the trustees to charge $1 for admission to 
the gallery. All told there have been “twenty-nine decisions discussing the Foundation and 
its operations.” PATTY GERSTENBLITH, ART, CULTURAL HERITAGE, AND THE LAW 280 (3d 
ed. 2012). 
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the Foundation’s “lesser” paintings to raise cash, even though any 
sale was strictly verboten by the Barnes’s Indenture.77 After public 
outcry, the trustees rescinded their proposal; instead, they petitioned 
the local Pennsylvania court for approval to exhibit part of the  
collection on a worldwide tour to raise funds, which the court  
ultimately approved, finding “that the deviation was administrative 
in nature and necessary to uphold the greater purpose of the  
Foundation—art education.”78 
Such administrative deviation commenced a long string of  
lawsuits that besieged the Barnes Foundation throughout the  
1990s and 2000s.79 The most significant change approved by the 
Pennsylvania courts was allowing the Foundation and its collection 
to be moved from Merion to downtown Philadelphia,80 a decision 
that was explicitly against Barnes’s wishes. The court justified this  
drastic change by grounding its decision in the doctrine of equitable 
deviation rather than cy pres.81 However, it will forever remain  
a mystery “[w]hether Dr. Barnes considered the directions concern-
ing the location of the art part of his purpose restrictions or only  
administrative restrictions.”82 
C. Stieglitz Collection at Fisk University 
Georgia O’Keeffe’s gift of the Alfred Stieglitz collection to Fisk 
University in Tennessee provides another example of a donee  
institution being strapped for cash and no longer able to fulfill the 
donor’s wish as originally prescribed.83 Like Indiana, O’Keeffe does 
not appear to have accounted for changed circumstances:  
 
77 Abbinante, supra note 72, at 673 (citing Robert Hughes, Opening the Barnes Doors, 
TIME, May 10, 1993, at 61, 62). 
78 Id. at 674 (citing In re Barnes Found., No. 58–788, slip op. at 3, 7, 13, 16 (C.P. Ct. 
Montgomery County, Pa., Orphans’ Ct. Div. July 21, 1992)). 
79 See GERSTENBLITH, supra note 76, at 281. 
80 See In re Barnes Found., 2004 WL 2903655, at *19–20 (C.P. Ct. Montgomery 
County, Pa., Orphans’ Ct. Div. Dec. 13, 2004). 
81 Id. at *19, *19 n.13. 
82 Gary, Problems with Donor Intent, supra note 73, at 987. 
83 See Georgia O’Keeffe Found. v. Fisk Univ., 312 S.W.3d 1, 4 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2009). 
See also Melanie B. Leslie, Time to Sever the Dead Hand: Fisk University and the Cost of 
the Cy Pres Doctrine, 31 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1 (2012); Alan L. Feld, The Nature 
of Fiduciary Law and Its Relationship to Other Legal Doctrines and Categories: Who Are 
the Beneficiaries of Fisk University’s Stieglitz Collection?, 91 B.U.L. REV. 873 (2011). 
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She gave no guidance on how Fisk should respond  
to changed circumstances or as to which of her  
objectives—benefitting Fisk, creating a perpetual 
memorial in honor of Stieglitz, keeping the Collec-
tion together, prohibiting sale of the Collection, and 
ensuring that the Collection remained in the South—
should be given priority in the event that changed  
circumstances should cause them to come into  
conflict.84  
Ultimately the court used the cy pres doctrine to grant Fisk “permis-
sion to sell a fifty percent interest in the Collection to the Crystal 
Bridges Museum in Arkansas.”85 The court reached this conclusion 
after focusing on the donor’s intent of keeping the Collection in the 
South,86 although there is little to no indication that O’Keeffe had 
this intent in mind when she donated the collection.87 
D. Mark Rothko Estate and Foundation 
Finally, the overlapping administration of Mark Rothko’s estate 
and foundation portend the future of Indiana’s estate. Mark Rothko 
seemed to make all the right choices in his will by appointing three 
close friends—one an accountant, another a painter, and the last an 
anthropology professor—as executors of his estate and directors of 
the Foundation that he formed before his tragic death by suicide.88 
At the time, New York law limited charitable gifts to a maximum of 
fifty percent of the estate and mandated a statutory minimum go to 
Rothko’s widow and his minor children.89 While the house, its  
contents, and $250,000 went to Rothko’s family, the remainder of 
 
The Rose Art Museum controversy in the late 2000s is another example of a university 
strapped for cash that attempted to deaccession its collection. See Gary, Problems with 
Donor Intent, supra note 73, at 993–95. 
84 Leslie, supra note 83, at 1, 2–3. 
85 Id. at 3 (citing In re Fisk Univ., 392 S.W.3d 582 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 29, 2011)). 
86 See In re Fisk Univ., 392 S.W.3d at 593. 
87 See Leslie, supra note 83, at 1, 2–3.Id. 
88 MERRYMAN ET AL., supra note 3, at 941. 
89 Id. 
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his estate, including approximately eight hundred paintings, were 
left to the Foundation, run by the executors of his estate.90 
Unfortunately for Rothko’s children (his widow died shortly  
after Rothko’s suicide), the executors of the estate breached their 
fiduciary duties by entering into a highly disadvantageous, con-
flicted transaction91 with Marlborough Gallery, by agreeing to sell 
paintings to the gallery “with a 50 percent commission, unless the 
paintings were sold to or through other dealers, in which case the 
commission was to be 40 percent.”92 Several terms in these agree-
ments between the executors of Rothko’s estate and Marlborough 
Gallery were highly questionable, particularly the inflated commis-
sion, as “paintings sold during Rothko’s lifetime through Marlbor-
ough had earned only a 10 percent commission.”93 As a result of the 
ensuing litigation jointly filed by Rothko’s children and the New 
York State Attorney General,94 all three executors were found to 
have violated their fiduciary duties, were removed as executors, and 
were fined between $6.4 and $9.3 million in damages.95 
II. THE LAW OF WILLS, CHARITABLE FOUNDATIONS, FIDUCIARY 
DUTIES, AND DEVIATIONS FROM TESTATORS’ WISHES 
Artists’ estates can have many corresponding legal issues, as 
outlined in the introduction,96 but this Note focuses on some of the 
most important problems that frequently spark legal controversy in 
relation to wills and charitable foundations and the corresponding 
legal remedies available for when testators’ wishes regarding their 
bequests are impracticable to execute due to changed circumstances. 
 
90 Id.; see also In re Estate of Rothko, 84 Misc. 2d 830, 834–35, 379 N.Y.S.2d 923, 932 
(Sur. Ct. 1975). 
91 One of the executors Rothko appointed was a director of Marlborough Gallery, while 
another was an artist represented by the gallery. See In re Estate of Rothko, 84 Misc. 2d at 
842–844. 
92 Stapper, supra note 6, at 1042. See also In re Estate of Rothko, 84 Misc. 2d at 852. 
93 Stapper, supra note 6, at 1042. Other questionable provisions included “interest-free 
installment payments over a twelve-year period” and the “sale of so many paintings within 
a short period of time.” Id. 
94 MERRYMAN ET AL., supra note 3, at 941. 
95 In re Estate of Rothko, 84 Misc. 2d at 887, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 978. 
96 See supra notes 5–8 and accompanying text. 
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A. The Will and the Importance of Choosing Appropriate 
Executors 
Nearly every person dies with some property left behind, and 
those who are prudent (and perhaps wealthy enough) execute a will 
explaining to survivors what should be done with this leftover  
property. Every state in the United States has a Probate Code  
prescribing the rules to make such a will enforceable.97 Generally, 
such rules define a will as a written document outlining the  
deceased’s wishes and also require strictly observed formalities, 
such as attestation by disinterested witnesses and a signature by the  
deceased (i.e., the testator).98 In the will, the testator specifies how 
she wishes to dispose of her property that remains upon her death.99 
For instance, artworks are typically distributed under a will by  
bequest to specific individuals or to a class.100 Indiana deviated from 
these norms by bequeathing his artwork to neither of these catego-
ries, but rather to a 501(c)(3) foundation.101 Barnes did something 
similar when he gifted all of his artwork to his foundation, although 
his foundation was set up while he was still alive.102 
One of the designations that a testator can make in a will is who 
the executor (or executors) of the estate should be,103 an appoint-
ment that is crucial for artists, as executors often control the dispo-
sition of the artist’s artworks from the estate.104 With this power, the 
executor can control the reputation of an artist and the value of an 
artist’s works by decreeing how often, where, and to whom such 
artworks are sold.105 The choice of executors and their powers is 
 
97 ROBERT SITKOFF & JESSE DUKEMINIER, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 141 (10th ed. 
2017). 
98 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 3.1 (AM. 
LAW INST. 2003). 
99 TAD CRAWFORD, LEGAL GUIDE FOR THE VISUAL ARTIST 225 (5th ed. 2010). 
100 Id. (“A bequest means a transfer of property under a will, while a gift is used to mean 
a transfer of property during the life of the person who gives the property.”) 
101 See supra text accompanying note 22. 
102 See supra text accompanying note 74. 
103 See Crawford, supra note 99, at 226. 
104 Henry Lydiate, Death of an Artist, ARTQUEST (2014), https://www.artquest.org.uk/
artlaw-article/death-of-an-artist/ [https://perma.cc/B9DL-6HRT] (discussing the powers of 
an executor under British law, although the findings are equally applicable to American 
estates). 
105 See id.; see also MERRYMAN ET AL., supra note 3, at 924; Little, supra note 4. 
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unique to each estate and should be based on the artist’s own situa-
tion.106 However, the executor must be “capable of making the  
necessary artistic and financial decisions for the estate.”107 On the 
artistic front, a well-qualified executor for an artist’s estate would 
exhibit various virtues and attributes, including “know[ing] and 
car[ing] deeply about the deceased,” being “sufficiently well orga-
nized and energetic to deal with the technicalities of inventories,  
valuation, [and] returns,” and knowing the applicable surrounding 
law.108 Financially, the executors also must maximize the assets in 
order to fulfill their fiduciary duty to the beneficiaries.109 
Such attributes are difficult to find in one person alone; thus, 
artists frequently appoint joint executors, with one being an art  
expert and the other a financial expert, so that all of an artist’s  
interests are represented adequately and the estate is well run.110  
Unfortunately, such precautions still may not adequately protect an 
artist’s interests, as demonstrated by the Rothko controversy, in 
which the artist was seemingly prudent in appointing three close 
friends with varied backgrounds as executors; yet, his estate was still 
exploited and subjected to a breach of fiduciary duty.111 
Indiana’s choice of attorney James Brannan as executor of his 
estate does not seem to follow the usual guidelines of an artist’s  
executor outlined above and appears particularly imprudent, as 
Brannan lacks knowledge about Indiana’s oeuvre and may be too 
heavily concerned with financials at the cost of preserving Indiana’s  
collection.112 A primary tenet of trusts and estate law is effectuating 
testator intent, which appears easy for Brannan to fulfill, as Indiana 
clearly demonstrated his intent in his will to convert his house into 
 
106 See Crawford, supra note 99, at 226. 
107 Id. 
108 MERRYMAN ET AL., supra note 3, at 924–925 (“As pointed out by Surrogate Midonick 
in the Rothko case, . . . executors must have undivided loyalty or integrity, and good 
judgment, firmness, independence, and active involvement.”) (citing In re Estate of 
Rothko, 84 Misc. 2d 830, 847, 379 N.Y.S.2d 923, 943 (Sur. Ct. 1975)). See also Stapper, 
supra note 6, at 1041–45; CRAWFORD, supra note 99, at 226–27. 
109 See MERRYMAN ET AL., supra note 3, at 925. 
110 See MERRYMAN ET AL., supra note 3, at 924 (5th ed. 2007); see also CRAWFORD, supra 
note 99, at 226–27. 
111 See supra Section I.D. 
112 See supra text accompanying notes 48–61. 
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a museum comprised of his artworks.113 However, Brannan’s  
actions as executor have demonstrated the inherent challenge in  
effectuating such intent, as Indiana’s house is crumbling and all of 
his liquid assets appear to have been spent on securing counsel to 
represent the estate in the federal litigation in New York.114 Thus, as 
mentioned previously, Brannan had to resort to selling two works in 
Indiana’s collection to pay for litigation expenses and emergency 
repairs on the Star of Hope building.115 
In selling off these works, Brannan has shown that he thinks 
more practically rather than aesthetically when it comes to  
managing Indiana’s collection and may not exhibit the appropriate 
sensitivity toward and concern for the artist’s reputation. Brannan’s 
readiness to sell off estate artworks is worrying. Although  
Brannan did consult a curator before selling the two paintings in  
November 2018, his secretiveness about the decision and his  
unwillingness to disclose the curator’s identity could be a distressing 
sign of how he will operate the museum as a director and potentially 
deaccession more of Indiana’s works until the estate dwindles to 
nothing.116 There may also be ethical concerns to consider in having 
the same attorney who drafted Indiana’s will serve as executor of 
Indiana’s estate and co-director of Indiana’s foundation, particularly 
since Brannan receives payments for serving in all of these roles.117 
B. Charitable Trusts/Foundations 
Many artists have made the wise choice to create a nonprofit, 
private foundation while alive, or upon their death via their will, to 
avoid tax liability and ensure that their artworks are managed by 
trustees or directors in an organization operating with funds of its 
own and servicing the public benefit.118 Because they serve the  
 
113 See supra text accompanying notes 22–23. 
114 See supra text accompanying notes 47–49. 
115 See Bowley & Carpenter, Estate to Sell Art, supra note 55. As mentioned previously, 
such a move is not illegal, as Maine law grants “an executor the power to sell assets as he 
administers the estate and there is no required judicial review.” Id.; see also supra note 57. 
116 See supra text accompanying note 47. 
117 See Stapper, supra note 6, at 1043–44; see also N.Y. SUR. CT. PROC. Act § 2307–a. 
118 See, e.g., Little, supra note 4 (discussing foundations set up by Rothko, Salvador Dalí, 
Warhol, and Moore, among others); Christa Blatchford, Are Artists’ Estates Too Protective 
of Artists’ Reputations?, APOLLO MAG. (Jan. 30, 2017), https://www.apollo-magazine.com
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general public, such foundations, like the one Indiana created in 
2016, are classified as charitable, in contrast to private trusts, where 
the beneficiaries are a small number of named beneficiaries, who are 
generally listed in the documents establishing the foundation.119 
“This attribute—that charities operate for the benefit of the general 
public rather than a restricted and identified class of beneficiaries—
shapes the legal accountability of charities. Donors transfer property 
to a charity so that it can provide a public benefit.”120 Like the  
Barnes Foundation,121 Indiana’s Star of Hope Foundation is a  
“privately created and operated institution that serves the public  
in some manner.”122 Another advantage of private, charitable foun-
dations is that they are exempt from the Rule Against Perpetuities, 
meaning they can be “potentially infinite in duration.”123 
However, donors to charities, including even testators’ repre-
sentatives when deceased parties bequeath gifts in their will (e.g., 
Indiana’s estate once Indiana bequeathed his collection to the Star 
of Hope Foundation), generally lack the standing to sue should  
the charities fail to fulfill conditions on a gift or violate fiduciary  
duties.124 Because the general public is considered the “recipient” of 
a charity’s benefits, no individual other than the state Attorney Gen-
eral in which the charity is registered has the standing to sue, thus 
leaving the job of protecting the public’s interest in the charity’s 
conduct to the state Attorney General.125 This legal issue of who has 
standing to sue can create problems, particularly when the interest 
 
/artists-estates-manage-reputations/ [https://perma.cc/EK2E-BC3K] (Blatchford is the 
CEO of the Joan Mitchell Foundation and discussed her work carrying out artist Joan 
Mitchell’s vision in directly supporting visual artists). 
119 Abbinante, supra note 72, at 679. 
120 Feld, supra note 83, at 874. 
121 See supra Section I.B. 
122 Abbinante, supra note 72, at 679. 
123 Id. (quoting Roger G. Sisson, Comment: Relaxing the Dead Hand’s Grip: Charitable 
Efficiency and the Doctrine of Cy Pres, 74 VA. L. REV. 635, 635 (1988)). See also 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS, § 27.3(2) (AM. 
LAW INST. 2003). 
124 Feld, supra note 83, at 874. 
125 Id.; see also supra note 66 and accompanying text. For further reading on the 
controversial topic of standing in the charity context, see Brody, supra note 63. See also 
Kelly McNabb, What “Being a Watchdog” Really Means: Removing the Attorney General 
from the Supervision of Charitable Trusts, 96 MINN. L. REV. 1795, 1800 (2012). 
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in protecting the public interest diverges from the responsibility  
of protecting the donor’s intent.126 Compounding problems further 
is the Attorney General’s status as a politician, since “political  
considerations may become part of the decision in connection with 
monitoring a charitable trust, at least in high-profile cases.”127 Thus, 
if Jamie Thomas or James Brannan commit fiduciary duty breaches 
by mishandling Indiana’s collection in the course of their conduct as 
directors of the Star of Hope Foundation, the only person legally 
entitled to sue is Maine’s Attorney General.128 Indeed, the Maine 
Attorney General has said that it is monitoring the Indiana litigation 
proceedings, although it is unclear what legal remedies, if any, the 
Attorney General could take if all of the estate assets (i.e., the art 
collection) are depleted in funding the litigation and repairing the 
house before the museum has a chance to be established.129 
On a managerial level, the officers and directors of a charitable 
enterprise, much like a for-profit corporation, “operate subject to  
the twin [fiduciary] duties of care and loyalty in acting for the  
institution,” with great deference given by courts to the institution’s  
actions that are based on “honest judgment.”130 Thus, appointing 
trustworthy directors to run the charitable corporation is crucial,  
as the directors are given broad discretion in their management.131 
While “[a]ll charitable not-for-profits operate subject to a non- 
 
126 See Susan N. Gary, Restricted Charitable Gifts: Public Benefit, Public Voice, 81 ALB. 
L. REV. 565, 597 (2018) [hereinafter Gary, Restricted Charitable Gifts]. 
127 Id. at 598. Gary cites the Hershey Trust in Pennsylvania as an example, and earlier 
references the potentially political reasons the Pennsylvania Attorney General advocated 
for the Barnes Foundation museum to be moved to downtown Philadelphia. See id. at 595, 
598. 
128 See supra text accompanying notes 63–65. 
129 See id. 
130 Feld, supra note 83, at 875. 
131 See DUBOFF ET AL., supra note 57, at 162–63. For further reading on the vital role 
trustees/directors play in nonprofit governance, see Jennifer L. White, When It’s OK to Sell 
the Monet: A Trustee-Fiduciary Duty Framework for Analyzing the Deaccessioning of Art 
to Meet Museum Operating Expenses, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1041 (1996); Evelyn Brody, The 
Limits of Charity Fiduciary Law, 57 MD. L. REV. 1400 (1998); Charles Bryan Baron, Self-
Dealing Trustees and the Exoneration Clause: Can Trustees Ever Profit from Transactions 
Involving Trust Property?, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 43 (1998); Nina J. Crimm, A Case Study 
of a Private Foundation’s Governance and Self-Interested Fiduciaries Calls for Further 
Regulation, 50 EMORY L.J. 1093 (2001); Karen E. Boxx, Of Punctilios and Paybacks: The 
Duty of Loyalty Under the Uniform Trust Code, 67 MO. L. REV. 279 (2002). 
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distribution rule,” meaning that the charity cannot “distribute any 
part of its income to the charity’s insiders,” the charity can still  
enrich its managers in other ways, including the payment of high 
salaries and “elaborate fringe benefits.”132 The only constraint on 
salaries imposed by tax law is a reasonableness test, wherein the  
IRS must overcome the rebuttable presumption that the salary is  
reasonable with sufficient evidence to the contrary, thus giving  
charities considerable latitude to pay their directors handsomely.133 
Such creative manipulation of director duty for unjust enrich-
ment was seen in the Rothko case, as two of the three executors/ 
directors of the Rothko Foundation had direct economic ties to the 
Marlborough Gallery, with whom they had contracted to consign 
Rothko’s artworks.134 In a similar vein, Jamie Thomas, as attorney-
in-fact for Indiana, has already made questionable ethical and finan-
cial decisions, such as withdrawing large sums of cash, increasing 
his salary, and cutting off communication to Indiana from the  
outside world. These actions suggest that Thomas could be held  
liable for breaches of the fiduciary duties of care and loyalty; regard-
less of his ultimate culpability, these actions do not instill trust in 
Thomas as a director of the Star of Hope Foundation.135 
Besides issues of adherence to fiduciary duties, complications 
can arise when an institution has a mission beyond being a  
conservator of valuable artworks, such as when it also maintains the 
historic preservation of a famous building housing the artworks.  
In such cases, institutions “may seek to realize the monetary appre-
ciation in its art, by way of sale or otherwise, in order to support its 
other purposes.”136 These competing missions can create contro-
versy, particularly within the museum community, where there is a 
strong undercurrent of antipathy towards deaccessioning for any 
purposes other than to “reinvest[] the proceeds in other artwork.”137 
 
132 Feld, supra note 83, at 876. 
133 Id.; see also 26 C.F.R. § 53.4958–6 (2010). 
134 See supra text accompanying notes 87–94. 
135 See supra text accompanying notes 42–46. 
136 Feld, supra note 83, at 878. 
137 Id. (citing ASS’N ART MUSEUM DIRECTORS, AAMD POLICY ON DEACCESSIONING 4 
(June 9, 2010) https://aamd.org/sites/default/files/document/AAMD%20Policy%20on%
20Deaccessioning%20website_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/LD2W-WUHG] (“Funds received 
from the disposal of a deaccessioned work . . . may be used only for the acquisition of 
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The Association of Museum Directors can even impose sanctions if 
a museum sells artwork and plans to use the money for an operating 
budget and general maintenance.138 This tension between preserving 
the museum’s structure and taking proper care of the artworks was 
seen in the Barnes Foundation’s move to downtown Philadelphia139 
and could be implicated in Indiana’s case, as the repairs to the house 
are estimated to cost $10 million.140 
As appears to be evidenced in Indiana’s case, problems,  
particularly liquidity issues, can emerge in carrying out the testator’s 
wishes when his estate is “art-rich and cash-poor.”141 The estate’s 
valuation in such a case all comes from the works of art which have 
traditionally been illiquid assets, and a high valuation of the estate 
results in a higher bill for taxes and probate administration.142 If the 
estate does not have sufficient cash to pay the bills, “works may have 
to be sold to meet sudden, large cash requirements. Such ‘distress’ 
sales depress the market for the artist’s work and result in disorderly 
disposition of his oeuvre.”143 Indiana’s estate administration has  
unfortunately already fit this description, as Brannan sold two  
artworks from Indiana’s estate to abate the immediate, dire need for 
large sums of cash.144 
 
works in a manner consistent with the museum’s policy on the use of restricted acquisition 
funds.”). The Policy was amended in 2015 and further limited the actions that may be taken 
with the funds from deaccessioned art: “[Such] [f]unds . . . shall not be used for operations 
or capital expenses. Such funds, including any earnings and appreciation thereon, may be 
used only for the acquisition of works in a manner consistent with the museum’s policy on 
the use of restricted acquisition funds.” Id. 
138 Feld, supra note 83, at 878. Feld’s article cites an instance from 2009 wherein the 
National Academy Museum in New York was penalized by the AAMD for selling two 
Hudson River paintings in 2008. The penalty included a ban on loaning artworks to or 
borrowing artworks from other Association members as well as any other program 
collaborations. See Donn Zaretsky, AAMD Rules Need to Be Deaccessioned, ART AM. 
(Mar. 31, 2009), https://www.artinamericamagazine.com/news-opinion/the-market/2009-
03-31/aamd-rules-need-to-be-deaccessioned/ [https://perma.cc/U4RN-E3WD]. 
139 See supra text accompanying note 82. 
140 See Willy Blackmore, The Fight Over Robert Indiana’s Estate, INDIANAPOLIS 
MONTHLY (Feb. 8, 2019), https://www.indianapolismonthly.com/arts-and-culture/the-
fight-over-robert-indianas-estate [https://perma.cc/C5NH-X6BK]. 
141 MERRYMAN ET AL., supra note 3, at 925. 
142 Id. 
143 Id. 
144 See supra text accompanying note 55. 
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However, in this case, the cash was not for taxes or probate  
administration, but instead for exorbitant litigation costs and  
emergency repairs required to fix Indiana’s Star of Hope house, 
which had a leaking roof.145 While the two works sold by Brannan 
in November 2018 were not created by Indiana himself, many  
people close to Indiana protested the works chosen as being central 
to Indiana’s oeuvre and detracting from the cohesiveness of his  
collection.146 Additionally, the immediacy of Brannan’s action (six 
months after Indiana’s death) is a worrying sign about which side 
will win out in the war between paying the cost of repairs to turn the 
Star of Hope into a museum-worthy building and keeping Indiana’s 
collection intact.147 
C. Cy Pres and Equitable Deviation Doctrines: Balancing Public 
Benefit and Donor Intent 
While the law is unclear on whether the restricted gift that  
Indiana bequeathed to the Star of Hope Foundation creates a chari-
table trust,148 the modification rules of cy pres and equitable devia-
tion are equally applicable regardless of whether a charitable trust 
was formed or Indiana’s bequest is simply a restricted gift held by 
the Star of Hope Foundation, a nonprofit corporation.149 Because 
charitable gifts are exempt from the common law Rule Against  
Perpetuities, “the restrictions placed on a charitable gift by the donor 
may last for a very long period of time.”150 While circumstances 
may change over time, rendering modification of the original gift 
 
145 See supra text accompanying notes 47–49. 
146 See supra text accompanying notes 57–60. 
147 See supra text accompany note 112. 
148 Gary, Problems with Donor Intent, supra note 73, at 998 (citing the differing opinions 
between RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 28 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 2003) and Section 
400(a) and (b) of PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NONPROFIT ORGS. (The American Law 
Institute Preliminary Draft No. 5 2009)). 
149 Id. at 1000–01 (“Courts have applied the rules of cy pres and deviation to restricted 
gifts held by nonprofit corporations, but no direct statutory authority existed for the 
application of those rules . . . . [T]he modification rules of cy pres and deviation apply to 
charitable trusts through trust law, to restrictions on funds held by nonprofit corporations 
through [Uniform Prudent Management of Institutional Funds Act (UPMIFA)], and to 
restrictions on other assets held by nonprofit corporations through case law.”). 
150 See GERSTENBLITH, supra note 76, at 261; see also supra text accompanying note 123. 
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terms necessary,151 such a change cannot be done unilaterally by  
the recipient of the gift without “run[ning] the risk of suffering  
a forfeiture” if such modification is found to be a violation of the 
gift’s terms.152 
In response to this dilemma, the equitable doctrines of cy pres 
and equitable deviation have developed over the centuries to permit 
charitable trusts to be saved by allowing the purpose of the gift to 
be modified in the case of cy pres (i.e., a substantive modification) 
or the methods by which the purpose is to be carried out to be altered 
in the case of equitable deviation (i.e., a procedural modification).153 
The term cy pres is taken from the French cy pres comme possible, 
meaning “as near as possible,”154 and the doctrine “ties the modifi-
cation to the donor’s intent,” as the “modification should be ‘as near 
as possible’ to the original purpose” of the donor.155 Under this doc-
trine, when it becomes impossible, impracticable, or illegal to carry 
out the settlor’s particular purpose set out in the trust instrument due 
to changed circumstances, a court will not allow the trust to fail  
but will redirect the trust assets to some other charitable purpose 
“that reasonably approximates the designated purpose.”156 There  
is generally a preference by courts to keep the trust intact, with  
modification, rather than let it fail and go through reversion.157 
A determination of a general charitable intent used to be  
evaluated in courts,158 but over time courts rarely allowed a gift  
to fail and revert to the donor’s heirs; instead, the majority of states, 
including Maine, have adopted the Uniform Trust Code, which  
 
151 Gary, Problems with Donor Intent, supra note 73, at 1022. 
152 GERSTENBLITH, supra note 76, at 261. 
153 Id. 
154 Gary, Problems with Donor Intent, supra note 73, at 1023 n.288 (noting that per 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 67 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 2003), cy pres does not 
literally require the “substitute or supplementary purpose to be the nearest possible but one 
reasonably similar or close to the settlor’s designated purpose, or ‘falling within the general 
charitable purpose’ of the settler”). 
155 Id. at 1023. 
156 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 67 (AM. LAW INST. 2012). 
157 See id. at § 67 cmt. b. 
158 15 AM. JUR. 2D Charities § 147 (2011). 
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“creates a presumption of general charitable intent.”159 The courts 
are required to make a judicial finding of the donor’s intention  
as applied to new conditions, although cy pres is a liberal rule of 
construction to carry out, not defeat, the settlor’s intent.160 While 
changed circumstances generally occur many years after the gift has 
first been put to use by the charity, “[c]y pres can also be applied to 
new gifts, most commonly in the case of bequests.”161 The most  
important issue in a cy pres case is the intent of the testator, and this 
intent “depends on documentation at the time of the gift and not 
thoughts about what a donor might have intended under changed 
circumstances, but the discussion of donor intent includes thoughts 
about later intent as well as intent at the time of the gift.”162 
Equitable deviation (or deviation), by contrast, does not “modify 
a restriction on the purpose of a gift,” but instead modifies “a  
restriction on how the charity carries out the purpose.”163 Cy pres 
focuses on shifting the intent of the donor, while deviation permits 
an administrative change that will help the charity carry out the  
donor’s intent.164 The distinction between the two doctrines is often 
tenuous and can be manipulated based on how a party wants to  
characterize the situation to achieve their desired outcome.165 For 
example, the parties in the Barnes Foundation litigation reclassified 
changes as cy pres or equitable deviation depending on which side 
 
159 Gary, Restricted Charitable Gifts, supra note 126, at 585. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 18–B, § 413 (2003) for the Maine statute implementing the Uniform Trust Code. I have 
included mention of Maine as that is the state where Indiana’s will was probated. 
160 15 AM. JUR. 2D Charities § 144 (2011). For more on the issues involved in 
determining settlor’s intent, see Heinrich Schweizer, Settlor’s Intent vs. Trustee’s Will: The 
Barnes Foundation Case, 29 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 63 (2005). 
161 Rob Atkinson, Reforming Cy Pres Reform, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 1111, 1115 n.10 (1993) 
(“Here, typically owing to the lapse of time between death and the execution of the will, 
the donor would have been unaware when the gift became effective of circumstances that 
would preclude precise execution of his or her wishes within the confines of legally defined 
charitable purposes”). 
162 Gary, Problems with Donor Intent, supra note 73, at 978 n.2. 
163 Id. at 978–79 (emphasis added). 
164 Id. at 979. 
165 Abbinante, supra note 72, at 685. Abbinante cites the Barnes Foundation dispute as a 
perfect example of such manipulation. Id. at 686. 
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they were advocating for, and the court ultimately relied on admin-
istrative deviation to make changes that completely altered the pur-
pose of Barnes’s trust and went against his wishes as the donor.166 
In Indiana’s case, the changed circumstances occurred much 
earlier than for the Barnes Foundation, as Indiana’s wish appeared 
to be impracticable to carry out even at Indiana’s death, as he left 
his house in too run-down of a condition; moreover, the prohibitive 
cost of restoring the house to museum quality will far outweigh any 
potential benefits that the museum could bring.167 This is especially 
true since the renovation seems likely to deplete all of the estate’s 
assets—i.e., the artworks in Indiana’s collection—since there are no 
other funds available to pay for the restoration. Thus, the trustees of 
Indiana’s foundation will probably have to petition the court in short 
order to alter the terms of the trust, and it remains to be seen whether 
such modification will be advocated as a cy pres or equitable devia-
tion change. If the trustees and the court adopt my suggested solu-
tion put forth below, then the cy pres doctrine could be utilized to 
allow Indiana’s charitable purpose to be adhered to closely, yet the 
result will be a drastic shift of location for Indiana’s art collection. 
D. Is It Time to Relinquish Dead-Hand Control? Legal Scholars’ 
Response to Cy Pres and Equitable Deviation 
Various legal scholars have argued in the wake of costly lawsuits 
due to changed circumstances such as the Barnes Foundation and 
O’Keeffe’s gift to Fisk University that the application of the  
doctrines of cy pres and equitable deviation should be amended or  
that the doctrines should be eliminated altogether.168 However, these 
scholars have disagreed as to whether such amendments should  
involve following more closely the settlor/testator’s intent in  
making the gift or abandoning such dead-hand control and focusing 
solely on maximizing the public benefit of the charitable gift.169 
Chris Abbinante is perhaps one of the staunchest advocates for 
adhering to donor intent. He argued in his influential Comment that 
 
166 See id. at 686–87; see also supra text accompanying note 82. 
167 See Blackmore, supra note 140. 
168 For an excellent overview of various scholars’ proposals for amending the cy 
pres/deviation doctrines, see Gary, Restricted Charitable Gifts, supra note 159, at 600–07. 
169 See id. at 600; see also Abbinante, supra note 72, at 705. 
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the Barnes case demonstrated “the legal system’s failure to uphold  
donor intent in the face of charitable-foundation trustees who wish 
to deviate from that intent.”170 Abbinante proposed adopting an  
additional legal hurdle for litigants to overcome when asking courts 
to rule on cy pres or administrative deviation petitions.171 This  
additional step would require courts to focus their initial inquiry on 
the necessity of the deviation, with a “rebuttable presumption 
against permitting any type of deviation from the intent of the donor, 
which can be overcome only when a trustee makes a showing of 
indisputable need.”172 Abbinante stated that the threshold test should 
be framed as a two-part inquiry to the parties seeking to deviate from 
the donor’s wishes: “(1) Have all reasonable efforts to comply with 
the terms of the [trust agreement] been exhausted? and (2) Will the 
foundation fail in its purpose if the desired deviation is not  
allowed?”173 Abbinante argued that failure of purpose only refers to 
impossibility or illegality and thus would eliminate petitions for cy 
pres and/or administrative deviation that only seek to modify based 
on impracticality.174 Abbinante acknowledged that this added legal 
threshold might cause more trusts to fail, but posited that this out-
come could be avoided if donors exercise more foresight and imple-
ment contingency plans and plan ahead for alternative uses of their 
trust assets in anticipation of changed circumstances.175 
On the other end of the spectrum, several scholars have advo-
cated for greater consideration of the public’s interest in a charitable 
gift, although these scholars have differed on how much deference 
should be given to the public interest.176 Ilana Eisenstein and John 
 
170 Abbinante, supra note 72, at 705. 
171 See id. 
172 Id. 
173 See id. at 705–06. 
174 Id. at 706. Abbinante averred that impracticality is too nebulous of a standard and 
allows courts and trustees to deviate from donor intent when such deviation is convenient 
or “suitable to their ulterior motives, such as efficiency.” Thus, he argued that 
impracticality should be rejected as grounds for modifying a donor’s intent. Id. at 706 
n.240. 
175 Id. at 707. 
176 See Gary, Restricted Charitable Gifts, supra note 126, at 605 (citing Katie 
Magallanes, Ilana H. Eisenstein, and John Nivala as scholars who have advocated for 
courts to direct their consideration to public interest when determining whether to modify 
a charitable gift). 
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Nivala agreed that the public has a strong interest in gifts that repre-
sent “the droit patrimoine,” i.e., “our collective cultural inher-
itance.”177 Both Eisenstein and Nivala argued that public interest 
should be protected even if the donor intent clearly contradicts such 
interest, as was demonstrated in the Barnes Foundation case.178 
Melanie Leslie advocated for a sort of middle ground between 
dead-hand control and public benefit by arguing that a legal rule 
should be adopted “limiting the duration of restrictions on charitable 
donations.”179 She proposes putting in a time constraint of forty 
years to enable donors to restrict the use of their gift for a “reasona-
ble period” but argues that such a restriction would “greatly reduce 
litigation over changed circumstances and the accompanying waste 
of charitable and public dollars.”180 Leslie argued that cy pres should 
still apply within the first forty years and that the law should grant 
standing to the donor or the donor’s heirs to enforce the terms of the 
charitable gift within that time frame.181 However, after the forty-
year period has lapsed, and in the event that a charity can no longer 
comply with the donor’s restrictions on the gift, Leslie states that the 
charity should be free to use the gift as they see fit, subject to its 
fiduciary duties of “care, loyalty and obedience to mission.”182 
Leslie avers that the Attorney General would still have the power to 
 
177 Id. (citing Ilana H. Eisenstein, Keeping Charity in Charitable Trust Law: The Barnes 
Foundation and the Case for Consideration of Public Interest in Administration of 
Charitable Trusts, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1747, 1783–86 (2003)). Gary also notes that Nivala 
used the Barnes Foundation as an example of such cultural heritage, as the collection, when 
displayed, represents “an intellectual, emotional and cultural experience.” Id. at 605 n.341 
(quoting John Nivala, Droit Patrimoine: The Barnes Collection, The Public Interest, and 
Protecting Our Cultural Inheritance, 55 RUTGERS L. REV. 477, 480 (2003)). 
178 See Eisenstein, supra note 177, at 1785–86; Nivala, supra note 177, at 481. 
179 Leslie, supra note 83, at 16. 
180 Id. It is unclear why Leslie chose forty years as the appropriate time period, and other 
scholars have written similar proposals with differing durations, including Alex Johnson, 
who argued that the duration should be the same as that governed by the Rule Against 
Perpetuities since this time frame represents the law’s balancing of the rights of the present 
generation against the rights of future generations. See Alex M. Johnson Jr., Limiting Dead 
Hand Control of Charitable Trusts: Expanding the Use of the Cy Pres Doctrine, 21 U. 
HAW. L. REV. 353, 354, 355, 391 (1999); see also Gary, Restricted Charitable Gifts, supra 
note 126, at 600–04 (citing a number of different legal scholars’ proposals for loosening 
the rules around modifying a charitable gift after a set number of years). 
181 See Leslie, supra note 83, at 16. 
182 Id. at 16–17. 
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enforce the donor restrictions should the charity violate these fidu-
ciary duties, but only after the initial forty-year period has lapsed.183 
Rob Atkinson has endorsed another alternative to court modifi-
cation of the charitable gift: giving the power to make key decisions 
in changed circumstances to the trustees or directors of the charity, 
subject to their fiduciary duty.184 The trustees would be legally  
empowered to use the assets as they see fit, but would be constrained 
by “what the state defines as charitable through common law, legis-
lation, or administrative regulation,” and by “extralegal mechanisms 
to enforce donor intent.”185 The Attorney General would still  
intervene should the trustees breach their fiduciary duties of care  
and loyalty, but the donor’s restrictions placed on the gift would  
henceforth only carry moral weight.186 Atkinson argued that the  
donor’s threat of cutting off future support to the charity would be 
serious enough to act as a safeguard for the charity trustees to adhere 
to their fiduciary duties.187 
Many of the solutions just described are inapt to solve the  
dilemma that arises when an artist only leaves behind their artworks 
and has no liquid assets to carry out their wishes, as is the case with 
Indiana’s estate. An artist’s estate requires special care in maintain-
ing the collection which can easily be mishandled by inexperienced 
or self-serving trustees, as was seen in the Mark Rothko controversy 
and appears likely to occur with Brannan and Thomas serving as 
trustees, neither of whom have art-world experience. Thus,  
Atkinson’s proposal to delegate important decisions to fiduciaries 
when changed circumstances arise would likely lead to more  
fiduciary breaches, particularly if artists appoint trustees who are 
self-interested in carrying out transactions or have no experience in 
the art world and therefore likely do not know the best way to pre-
serve an artist’s oeuvre. 
 
183 Id. at 17. 
184 See Rob Atkinson, supra note 161, at 1143. 
185 Id. 
186 See id. at 1144. 
187 See id. 
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Additionally, Abbinante’s proposal of eliminating impractical-
ity as a justification for modifying a charitable gift would unneces-
sarily constrain trustees and courts, since the heightened standards 
of impossibility and illegality seem exceedingly difficult to prove 
and would cause more trusts to fail, as Abbinante admitted.  
Further, Abbinante was too optimistic in hoping that donors would 
exercise more foresight and develop contingency plans, as demon-
strated by the previous cases as well as the ongoing litigation 
shrouding Indiana’s estate. Artists seem especially prone to lacking 
the foresight to develop backup plans should their initial wishes be  
impracticable to fulfill. But under Abbinante’s proposal, Indiana’s 
wish to create a museum out of his rundown house on an isolated 
island in Maine is not necessarily impossible to fulfill, but it is 
highly impracticable, as the estate has no liquid assets and would 
need to sell off one-fifth of Indiana’s art collection just to restore the 
Star of Hope house to museum quality.188 Thus, under Abbinante’s 
proposal, because Indiana failed to implement a contingency plan, 
his trust would likely fail, as all the artworks in the collection would 
be sold off in order to pay for the creation of the museum to  
house them. 
III. SOLUTION 
While no two cases are alike, each prior instance of  
complications related to an artist’s estate provides helpful precedent 
for artists creating their estate plans now. The Barnes Foundation, 
like Indiana’s future museum, was in a geographically isolated area, 
which hindered the museum’s generation of profits and ultimately 
led the Foundation to fall into dire straits. Indiana’s estate should 
thus exercise caution in opening a museum on Vinalhaven, as it is 
significantly harder to reach than Merion was for the Barnes  
Foundation and it is unclear how the museum would attract a suffi-
cient number of visitors to a remote island in order to offset the  
substantial overhead costs of running a museum. Additionally, like 
the Barnes Foundation, Indiana’s estate runs the risk of becoming 
 
188 See supra text accompanying note 140. 
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bankrupt if the litigation carries on for a long time, further draining 
what little liquid assets the estate has. 
In contrast to Barnes’s indenture, however, Indiana’s will is 
much less detailed and gives Brannan and Thomas as directors  
of the Foundation considerably more flexibility in running the  
museum. This flexibility should allow them to seek out more crea-
tive solutions and potential fundraising avenues that Barnes’s  
indenture strictly forbade.189 However, even with such a detailed  
indenture, the court in the Barnes case still applied equitable devia-
tion to blatantly go against the donor’s intent, a move that should 
sound alarm bells for future donors wishing to make restricted gifts. 
The court in the Fisk University case faced a similar dilemma 
with the Stieglitz Collection, yet employed cy pres in that case to 
apply its own definition of O’Keeffe’s donative intent. A compari-
son of the Fisk University and Barnes Foundation cases demon-
strates the inherent subjectivity of cy pres/administrative deviation 
analysis, and the arbitrariness of courts in applying these doctrines. 
Thus, Indiana’s estate should exercise caution in seeking judicial 
approval of any modifications that it may make, and try to frame 
such changes as administrative deviation, since that seems to grant 
greater flexibility to directors of nonprofit corporations than cy pres. 
Finally, the breaches of fiduciary duty in Mark Rothko’s case 
should serve as a cautionary tale for the fiduciaries involved in  
managing Indiana’s estate, since Rothko exercised care in who he 
chose as executors of his estate and these “close friends” still bla-
tantly breached their duties of care and loyalty. Unfortunately, 
Thomas already appears to demonstrate the sort of erratic behavior 
indicative of a breach of fiduciary duty by abusing his power of  
attorney and exerting undue influence over Indiana. Time will tell if 
Thomas and Brannan can avoid the kind of conflicted transaction  
in which Rothko’s executors engaged, although Thomas appears to 
have already completed such a transaction with McKenzie and AIA, 
if MAF’s allegations prove to be founded. 
 
189 Indiana’s will also doesn’t contain any reversionary language should the purpose fail 
to be carried out, in contrast to Barnes’s Indenture which contained such language but was 
ignored by the Pennsylvania courts. See Abbinante, supra note 72, at 686. Compare the 
discussion of Indiana Will, supra text accompanying notes 22–26. 
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Generally, cy pres applies after a sufficient period of time has 
passed, and it has been demonstrated that the intent of the donor  
can no longer be carried out based on the current condition of the 
foundation. However, it appears from the outset that the Star of 
Hope Foundation faces an uphill battle, as it is tethered to a rundown 
and remote house that needs emergency funds for extensive  
repairs.190 The Star of Hope’s disrepair was so bad it necessitated 
the emergency transport of Indiana’s works to a storage facility,  
as the house was too unfit for proper artwork storage.191 With  
Indiana’s estate being art-rich and cash-poor, there is no hefty  
endowment like the Barnes Foundation had, and it seems that deac-
cessioning will be necessary perhaps from the outset (as has already 
been seen with Brannan selling off two valuable works in Indiana’s 
collection simply to pay for the roof repairs and litigation fees).192 
Thus, the circumstances seem to have changed sufficiently from 
when Indiana drafted his will to justify modification—the real  
question is whether such a modification would require the use of cy 
pres or if equitable deviation would suffice. 
Unfortunately, Indiana did not plan for any changed circum-
stances aside from the possibility that either Brannan or Thomas 
would decline their duties as executor or director, respectively. 
Thus, the question of donor intent is left to the court to make a  
subjective judgment call. Additionally, the only parties who can  
request such a modification of Indiana’s will are the Attorney Gen-
eral of Maine and Thomas and Brannan as directors of the Star of 
Hope Foundation.193 Moving the collection to the Farnsworth  
Museum seems like the best solution because the intended benefi-
ciaries of Indiana’s estate are arguably Maine’s citizens, expanding 
the public benefit beyond the tiny town of Vinalhaven, with its 1,200 
residents. This solution appropriately balances the donor’s intent 
and the public benefit, a balance over which many scholars have 
debated.194 Indiana’s remarks to The Art Newspaper in 2012 that the 
 
190 See supra text accompanying notes 55–56. 
191 Id. 
192 Id. 
193 See supra note 125 and accompanying text for a discussion of standing. 
194 For an overview of various scholars’ arguments, see generally Atkinson, supra note 
161. 
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Farnsworth would probably inherit his collection point to his predi-
lection for the museum and indicate that he would perhaps not object 
to his collection being housed there if the Star of Hope cannot  
feasibly be converted into a museum.195 Additionally, the public 
benefit still remains with Maine and would be sufficiently isolated 
from the mainstream that Indiana so despised as to likely satisfy the 
reclusive and embittered artist. While Indiana had an honorable  
primary purpose of converting his formerly grand house into a  
museum, prudence will hopefully prevail here and the maximum 
public benefit for the art collection will be prioritized over the costly 
renovation of Star of Hope. This focus on the public benefit has the 
added bonus of allowing many more visitors to see the collection 
(and the collection to remain much larger) than would likely be the 
case if it remained on Vinalhaven. 
CONCLUSION 
This Note examined how changed circumstances can apply to a 
testator’s wishes soon after his or her death—as demonstrated by 
Robert Indiana’s request to turn his house into a museum to display 
his collection, which wish is impracticable from the outset. Based 
on prior cases such as the Barnes, Rothko, and Fisk, it is unclear 
whether either the cy pres or deviation doctrines would remedy this 
impracticability in a satisfactory manner. Thus, artists should be  
particularly careful to draft their wills to provide for alternative 
plans in the event of changed circumstances. By doing so, they will 
exercise the necessary foresight that Indiana lacked, as he provided 
no alternatives should the museum be impracticable to establish. 
Time will tell how much money gets swallowed up in the ongoing 
litigation and the cost of repairing the Star of Hope. However,  
Indiana’s case will hopefully serve as a cautionary tale to artists to 
consider the liquidity of their estates and the feasibility of creating 
museums when they have no cash flow to accompany their collec-
tions, and to consider other alternatives that still keep their  
collections in the public eye and provide long-lasting public benefit. 
 
 
195 See supra text accompanying note 67. 
